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— Note —
Apportionment: Shining the Light
of Day on Patent Damages
“The patentee . . . must . . . give evidence . . . to separate or
apportion the defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages between
the patented feature and the unpatented features . . . .” *
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Introduction
This story begins with Lucent Technologies’ Day Patent. 1 In
2008, Microsoft appealed a $357 million damage award for an
*

Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884); see also Jury Instructions at
31, Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 3:07-cv-02000-H-CAB (S.D.
Cal. July 29, 2011), ECF No. 1392 (using substantially identical wording).

1.

U.S. Patent No. 4,763,356 (filed Dec. 11, 1986) (the “Day Patent”).
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infringing feature in Microsoft Outlook. 2 Lucent’s patented feature
was a method for selecting dates in a calendar using a touchscreen.
At trial, the jury found that Microsoft infringed. 3 But the jury
then had the impossible task of calculating damages. The parties
presented myriad evidence on the reasonable royalty rate. But several
questions remained regarding how that rate applied to sales of
Microsoft Outlook. Should the jury use the entire value of Microsoft
Office, in which Outlook was bundled? What about all the other
noninfringing products in Office, like Word and Excel—does it make
sense to make Microsoft pay a royalty on those? How about using the
wholesale value of standalone Outlook? What about all its noninfringing e-mail and task manager components? What about the fact
that Microsoft makes less profit when Outlook is bundled into
Office—should sales of Office and standalone Outlook be valued
equally? How many people really use the touchscreen features of
Outlook? Are those features important? Should it matter? If the court
is to apply a reasonable royalty rate, it must apply that rate to a base
value, but what exactly is the value of the Day Patent?
These questions confounded the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. 4
The jury had awarded an exceedingly high lump-sum reasonable
royalty award in excess of $350 million. 5 But the jury provided no
explanation of its methodology. 6 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
speculated that the award might have been so high because the jury
applied its reasonable royalty rate to the entire market value of
Office. 7 The Federal Circuit, in holding that Lucent improperly used
the “entire market value” rule 8 to include other noninfringing
components in the calculation, 9 vacated this award and remanded for
2.

Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(Microsoft was a co-defendant).

3.

Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1028 (S.D.
Cal. 2008) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

4.

580 F.3d 1301.

5.

The median patent damage award from 2006 to 2011 was only $4 million.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2012 Patent Litigation Study:
Litigation Continues To Rise Amid Growing Awareness of
Patent Value 7 (2012) [hereinafter Patent Litigation Study],
available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/
assets/2012-patent-litigation-study.pdf.

6.

See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336 (speculating on several ways the jury
could have calculated its award).

7.

Id.

8.

See infra text accompanying notes 47–51 (explaining the entire market
value rule).

9.

Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336.
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a new trial on damages. 10 But the court gave little guidance on how to
calculate damages without the entire market value rule. 11
On remand, in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.
(Lucent II ), 12 the Southern District of California revived a centuryold and seldom used body of law—the law of apportionment. 13 In
particular, the court issued a jury instruction quoting language from
the 1884 seminal apportionment case, Garretson v. Clark. 14 Although
there is an extensive jurisprudence on apportionment law, Garretson
was decided in the context of a remedy at equity very different from
modern damages law. Accordingly, it is unclear how old apportionment cases would apply to modern cases. 15 Lucent II demonstrated
just how unclear. The court ultimately set aside the new apportionmentbased jury verdict because both parties failed to provide proper
apportionment evidence. 16
10.

Id. at 1340.

11.

Id. at 1339 (recognizing a request for more specific guidance on remand,
but declining to give such guidance because “neither party at trial
challenged any damages instruction that was given nor proposed an
instruction and objected when it was not given”).

12.

Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. (Lucent II ), 837 F. Supp. 2d
1107 (S.D. Cal. 2011).

13.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines apportionment generally as “[d]ivision into
proportionate shares.” Black’s Law Dictionary 116 (9th ed. 2009). For
the purposes of this Note, Professor Mark Lemley’s definition of apportionment is most useful: “dividing out the percentage of the production
that is attributable to the patent and, therefore, ought to be paid to the
patent owner.” Mark A. Lemley, Professor, Stanford Law School, Panel 2
at the Federal Trade Commission Hearing at the University of California:
The Evolving IP Marketplace 216 (May 5, 2009) [hereinafter FTC
Hearing], available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/
may4/090505transcript.pdf.

14.

Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884). Compare id. at 121 (“The
patentee . . . must . . . give evidence tending to separate or apportion
the defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages between the
patented feature and the unpatented features, and . . . the profits and
damages are to be calculated on the whole machine, for the reason that
the entire value of the whole machine, as a marketable article, is
properly and legally attributable to the patented feature.”), with Jury
Instructions at 31, Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 3:07-cv02000-H-CAB (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2011), ECF No. 1392 (“[T]he patentee
. . . must give evidence to separate or apportion the defendant’s profits
and the patentee’s . . . damages between the patented feature and the
unpatented features . . . .”).

15.

See Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment to Rein in
the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 9 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 21
(2008) (“[I]t is not readily apparent how a vast majority of apportionment
cases would apply in modern patent cases.”).

16.

Lucent II, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 (“[A] reasonable jury could not have
returned a verdict in excess of $26.3 million based on the evidence of
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The saga of the Day Patent illustrates a growing problem 17 in
patent damages law in that, in the case of complex technologies, 18
courts have no guidance when the entire market value rule does not
apply. To put the problem most simply: damage calculations are an
extremely fact-intensive exercise, but the current damages framework
excludes much of the most relevant evidence.
An apportionment finding should be added to calculate the
reasonable royalty base and improve evidentiary practice in patent
infringement cases. 19 Apportionment was a part of damage
calculations for over a century. But it has scarcely been used in the
last fifty years and has never been formally applied to reasonable
royalty calculations.
Several scholars have addressed apportionment in the last
decade. 20 This Note first expands upon their research to explain why
apportionment is necessary—especially in light of recent and
disturbing trends. Then this Note details a framework for trial courts
to apply apportionment. The apportionment proposed in this Note is
not the apportionment of days past. Instead, it is a novel framework
drawing on lessons from centuries of case law, problems presented by
new technologies, and—perhaps most importantly—the evidentiary
concerns at the heart of patent damage calculations.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly traverses the
history of patent damages and explains why there is no current
apportionment finding in royalty calculations. Next, Part II discusses
why such a finding is necessary and why it is compatible with current
damages law. This Part then addresses and rebuts the biggest
criticisms of apportionment: (1) claims by Non-Practicing Entities

record.”). The parties subsequently dismissed the case, so the Federal
Circuit will have no chance to opine on the issue. Lucent Techs., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 462 F. App’x 968 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (order of dismissal).
17.

See cases cited infra note 103 (listing recent cases in which courts have
struggled to apportion damages or apply the entire market value rule).

18.

A complex technology is one that contains many interworking components. See Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing
on S. 1145 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 258
(2007) [hereinafter 110 Hearing] (statement of Mary E. Doyle, Senior
Vice President and General Counsel, Palm, Inc.) (“For example, there
are more than 400 patents that have been claimed to be essential to
producing a DVD, tens of thousands of patents that may relate to a
single microprocessor and perhaps hundreds of thousands of patents that
may relate to a personal computer.”).

19.

This Note does not address the application of apportionment to other
forms of patent damages, such as lost profits.

20.

See infra text accompanying notes 83–89.
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(NPEs) 21 and the biotechnology industry that damage reform will
devalue patents; and (2) claims by legal scholars, mainly Federal
Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel, that apportionment is impractical.
Part III explores in detail how courts should conduct a modern
apportionment finding. In particular, in cases where apportionment is
warranted, courts should apply a distinct apportionment finding,
asking the jury to return a specific percentage value based on a set of
contextual factors. This Part also describes the kinds of evidence
parties would present to support or mitigate apportionment factors.
Part IV applies this newly proposed apportionment framework to
Lucent itself, demonstrating how apportionment can remedy
unwarranted damage awards. Finally, this Note concludes that a
distinct apportionment finding would increase the consistency of
patent damages and would be compatible with current damages law.

I.

A Brief History of Patent Damages

A brief history of patent damage law explains why courts
currently do not use apportionment findings with reasonable royalty
calculations.
In the nineteenth century, a patentee claiming infringement could
pursue either damages for lost profit in a court of law or,
alternatively, injunction in a court of equity. 22 In the latter half of the
century, however, courts of equity began to allow patentees to recoup
a portion of the infringer’s profits. Thus, after an injunction, the
patentee would not have to return to a court of law to obtain
monetary compensation. 23 In 1870, Congress codified profit accounting
as an equitable remedy and added an additional recovery for
damages. 24 But this new remedy was not without issue. Even before
codification, courts understood that a patentee of a component should

21.

NPEs, colloquially known as “patent trolls,” are companies that buy,
sell, and license patents but do not manufacture or sell the commercial
embodiments of those patents. See, e.g., IP Innovation, L.L.C. v.
Ecollege.com, 156 F. App’x 317, 324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the
defendant accused the plaintiff “of being a patent ‘troll’ that sought to
exact a settlement to avoid litigation expenses”).

22.

Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the
New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 Santa Clara L. Rev.
307, 313–14 (2006).

23.

Id. at 314.

24.

Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 206 (“[U]pon a decree being
rendered . . . for infringement, the [patentee] shall be entitled to recover,
in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the
damages the [patentee] has sustained thereby . . . .”).
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not be entitled to profits attributable to other, unpatented parts or
improved versions of an infringing product. 25
Over the next half-century, courts created fairly detailed
jurisprudence requiring that a patentee prove the portion of the
infringer’s profits that was attributable to the patented component or
improvement. 26 Profit apportionment soon led to serious problems,
however, as courts, attorneys, and juries struggled to untangle an
infringer’s accounting of increasingly complex machines. 27
To help patentees that could not feasibly prove a specific damage
amount, Congress amended the patent damages statute in 1922. 28
These amendments allowed courts to award a reasonable royalty as
damages when profits were uncertain. 29 The old profit accounting
remedy and the new reasonable royalty remedy coexisted for some
time, but the idea of apportionment was only applied to profit
accounting and never to reasonable royalty. 30 Meanwhile, profit
25.

See Whitney v. Mowry, 29 F. Cas. 1102, 1104 (S.D. Ohio 1868)
(“Suppose . . . it be a railroad car, the cost of which is thousands of
dollars, and some little invention is made in regard to the interior
structure of the car, or in its ornamentation, which is patentable under
the act of 1861; yet the slight, the simple thing is such as to strike the
public taste and judgment, and have such an effect in the commercial
world that nobody will buy the article without that invention; yet it
would seem to be a pretty hard measure of justice in a court of equity,
to say that the entire profits made on that large article should go into
the pockets of the inventor and patentee of this small thing, which had
been used without license or authority in connection with it.”).

26.

See Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (“The patentee . . .
must in every case give evidence tending to separate or apportion the
defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages between the patented
feature and the unpatented features . . . .” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

27.

See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co.,
225 U.S. 604 (1912) (holding that a patentee was entitled to all the
infringer’s profits because the infringer had mingled its receipts and
made profit apportionment impossible).

28.

Patent Act of 1922, ch. 58, § 8, 42 Stat. 389, 392 (current version
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006)).

29.

Courts had already begun to allow reasonable royalties in cases where
damages were otherwise uncertain. See, e.g., U.S. Frumentum Co. v.
Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 617 (6th Cir. 1914) (allowing a “reasonable royalty”
calculation as “damage not resting on any of the applicable, exact
methods of computation but upon facts and circumstances which permit
the jury or the court to estimate in a general, but in a sufficiently
accurate, way the injury to plaintiff caused by each infringing sale”).

30.

See Alliance Sec. Co. v. De Vilbliss Mfg. Co., 76 F.2d 503, 504 (6th Cir.
1935) (“[T]he appellant had failed to offer any evidence which would
serve as a basis for such an apportionment or for determining damages
and a reasonable royalty . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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accounting problems continued to multiply. As Judge Learned Hand
noted, “The difficulty of allocating profits in such cases has plagued
the courts from the outset, and will continue to do so, unless some
formal and conventional rule is laid down, which is not likely.
Properly, the question is in its nature unanswerable.” 31
Congress overhauled the patent code in 1952, 32 this time removing
the accounting of profits remedy. In a detailed and lengthy debate,
Congress rejected profit accounting as a “complete failure of justice”
because “artificial and unsound rules have been invented to solve the
impossible problem of how to apportion profits.” 33 The House
Committee on Patents found it “impossible to apportion profits” for
an improvement in a complex machine and observed that profit
apportionment proceedings were “always expensive [and] often
protracted for decades.” 34 The Supreme Court interpreted Congress’s
action as fully eliminating an infringer’s profits as a form of
recovery. 35 But courts stopped short of precluding apportionment
from reasonable royalty calculations, explicitly noting that Congress’s
problem with apportionment was only in the context of a profit
remedy. 36 Even so, apportionment was fully put to rest in W.L. Gore
& Associates, Inc. v. Carlisle Corp. 37 The court held that “[o]nce the
fact that sales have been lost has been proven, there is no occasion for
the application of apportionment.” 38 The W.L. Gore court did not
address apportionment in the context of reasonable royalty. Without

31.

Cincinnati Car Co. v. N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 66 F.2d 592, 593 (2d
Cir. 1933).

32.

Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 284, 66 Stat. 792, 813 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006)).

33.

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. (Georgia-Pacific II ), 243
F. Supp. 500, 523 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).

34.

Id. at 524 (quoting Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits: Hearing on
H.R. 5231 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 79th Cong. (1946)).

35.

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 506
(1964) (“[I]t is clear that under the present statute only damages are
recoverable.”).

36.

Georgia-Pacific II, 243 F. Supp. at 524–25 n.22 (“[T]he strongest
criticism of the pre-1946 system is reserved for those cases in which
‘profits’, not a reasonable royalty, was sought. In other words,
Congress’s attention was primarily focused on the evils attendant on the
recovery of ‘profits’ rather than on the obstacle in the path of a patent
owner seeking a reasonable royalty.” (emphasis added)).

37.

W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp. 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 353
(D. Del. 1978).

38.

Id. at 364.
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the profit accounting remedy, however, apportionment law has since
lain almost entirely dormant. 39
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York did consider apportionment when it created a set of fifteen
factors to guide a jury in “hypothetical negotiation” for determining
reasonable royalty in Georgia-Pacific. 40 Specifically, Factor 13 states
that juries should consider “[t]he portion of the realizable profit that
should be credited to the invention as distinguished from nonpatented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or
significant features or improvements added by the infringer.” 41 The
Federal Circuit, however, has rejected reliance on the Georgia-Pacific
apportionment factor. 42
39.

See Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits in Contemporary
Patent Damages Cases, 10 Va. J.L. & Tech., no. 8, Summer 2005, at
¶ 3 (“[M]odern patent damages cases rarely address apportionment.”).
Interestingly, the 1952 Patent Act retained a special profit remedy for
infringement of design patents. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 289, 66
Stat. 792, 813–14 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006)).
Congress created a separate remedy for design patents, in part because
apportionment produced harsh results for owners of design patents that
added, by nature, no functional utility to a product. See Nike, Inc. v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1441–43 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing the history of 35 U.S.C. § 289). Thus § 289 only allows for “total
profit” and not apportioned profit. 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). It would
seem that defendants facing a § 289-profit award are precluded from
arguing apportionment. Yet in a recently filed and ongoing case, the
defendant is arguing just that. Pacific Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v.
Malibu Boats, LLC, No. 6:12-cv-00033-JA-DAB (M.D. Fla. filed Jan. 10,
2012), concerns a design patent for a boat windshield. The patentee is
asking for § 289 profits from the sale of an entire boat, but the
defendant is arguing for apportioning out the value of the windshield.
See Plaintiff Pac. Coast Marine Windshields Ltd.’s Opposition to
Defendants’ Joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Under 35
U.S.C. § 289 and Supporting Memorandum Of Law at 12, Pac. Coast
Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, No. 6:12-cv-00033-JADAB (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2012), ECF No. 146 (“Malibu’s argument that
this Court must apportion Malibu’s profits is contrary to the plain
language of § 289 and the clear intent of Congress.”). The outcome of
this issue remains to be seen.

40.

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. (Georgia-Pacific III ), 318
F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The Federal Circuit has long
established that the Georgia-Pacific factors are a sound means for
determining reasonable royalty. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court has sanctioned
the use of the Georgia-Pacific factors to frame the reasonable royalty
inquiry.”).

41.

Georgia-Pacific III, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.

42.

The Federal Circuit noted that the Georgia-Pacific court itself declined
to apply apportionment because it found that the infringing device in
that case, a piece of plywood, was a physical “entirety.” Fromson v. W.
Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
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II. The Case for Apportionment
A.

Why an Apportionment Finding Is Necessary

Damages are an inexact science. 43 And reasonable royalties are by
far the most common type of damage award in patent cases. 44
Although the Federal Circuit has adopted the Georgia-Pacific factors
for determining reasonable royalty rate, 45 there is little guidance for
determining a base value on which to apply that royalty rate. 46 For
over a century, courts have used the entire market value rule to hold
that a patented component part can assume the value of the entire
infringing product in cases where the component is the substantial
basis for entire product’s value.
The entire market value rule can be traced back to Garretson v.
Clark. 47 Courts have since expanded the rule in several ways. In 1977,
overruled on other grounds by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In
a scathing opinion, Chief Judge Markey chastised the defendants for
invoking the Georgia-Pacific apportionment factor considering that the
Georgia-Pacific court itself declined to apply its own factor: “Cases
should not be cited for mere words. What counts is what the court did
in a cited case.” Id.
43.

Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega
Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563
(1931) (“[W]hile . . . damages may not be determined by mere
speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show[s] the extent
of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although
the result be only approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to
complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness and precision
that would be possible if the case, which he alone is responsible for
making, were otherwise.”).

44.

See Patent Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 11. Reasonable royalty
awards account for 81.9 percent of all damages awards from 2006 to 2011,
compared to just 1.7 percent and 32.2 percent for price erosion and lost
profits damages, respectively. As some litigants receive both reasonable
royalties and lost profits, the total is more than 100 percent. Id.

45.

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2011).

46.

See Damien Geradin & Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Value
Apportionment Rules for Complex, Multi-Patent Products, 27 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 763, 764 (2011) (“[W]hether the
royalty base for a given patent should include only the component(s) of
the product that the patent directly reads on or the product as a whole
seems an important question that has been hotly debated in courts and
also by scholars and policy-makers.” (footnotes omitted)).

47.

Garretson v.
could avoid
“reliable and
be calculated

Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (holding that a patentee
apportionment of profit or damages by showing with
satisfactory evidence, that the profits and damages are to
on the whole machine, for the reason that the entire value
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for example, the United States Court of Claims held that unpatented
plug-ins, sold with the infringing product, could be included in lost
profit damage calculations if they were “financially dependent on the
market created by the patented [device]” and if the patentee
“anticipate[d] sale of such unpatented components.” 48 In 1995,
moreover, the Federal Circuit held in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co. 49
that a patentee could include unpatented components in a lost profit
calculation if “[a]ll the components together [are] analogous to
components of a single assembly” or “constitute a functional unit.” 50
And although the entire market value rule was historically applied
only to lost profits, the Federal Circuit extended it to apply to
reasonable royalties bases. 51
But the entire market value rule has serious flaws. 52 First, it
provides little guidance for a royalty base in situations where the
unpatented components are not financially dependent on the patented
components. Second, it is not helpful when all the components
together are not a functional unit. The entire market value rule thus
creates a source of confusion for judges and juries when damage
experts testify using different base value standards. 53
Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall Rader, sitting by designation
in the Northern District of New York, exposed one of the entire
market value rule’s major flaws in Cornell University v. HewlettPackard Co. 54 The patent in Cornell University was for a technology
that increases the efficiency of a computer processor. In his damage
valuation, the patentee’s expert first attempted to use the entire PC’s
of the whole machine, as a marketable article, is properly and legally
attributable to the patented feature”).
48.

Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 351 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
Consequently, the dissent in Tektronix argued that the patent’s value
should have been apportioned from the unpatented parts prior to
calculating the reasonable royalty. Id. at 366 (Kashiwa, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).

49.

Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

50.

Id. at 1550.

51.

Id. at 1549.

52.

Brian J. Love, Patentee Overcompensation
Rule, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 263, 293 (2007)
criticized the overcompensation inherent
measure of damages, the entire market
egregious and noticeable offender.”).

53.

See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (remanding for a new trial on damages). See also cases cited infra
note 103.

54.

Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y.
2009).
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value as the royalty base. The court prevented the patentee from
providing testimony claiming the entire PC as the base because he
failed to show that the patented processor function drove demand for
the entire PC. 55 Instead, because the patentee claimed the “CPU
brick” 56 as the base, the jury calculated damages based on the CPU
brick’s value. Judge Rader, in granting the infringer’s post-verdict
motion for remittitur, held that the patentee had further failed to
establish that the patented process drove demand for the CPU
brick. 57 Instead, Judge Rader accepted the infringer’s argument that
the base should be the entire market value of only the processor,
because the processor was the “the smallest salable patent-practicing
unit” in the device. 58 Cornell is just one of many recent cases
struggling to apply the entire market value rule to complex
technology. 59
The entire market value rule also presents an evidentiary paradox
to plaintiffs relying on previous licenses to prove royalty rate.
Comparable license rates are an important guide in reasonable royalty

55.

Id. at 284.

56.

A “CPU brick” is the processor itself along with other ancillary
hardware components, including cache memory, power converters, and
temperature regulators. Id. at 283.

57.

Id. at 285.

58.

Id. at 283. It should be noted that had Judge Rader taken his reasoning
to its logical conclusion, he would have found that the patentee also did
not prove that its patented processor function drove demand for the
processor itself. Indeed, Judge Rader seemingly contradicted himself
when he said:
Without any real world transactions, or even any discernable
market for CPU bricks, less intrepid counsel would have wisely
abandoned a royalty base claim encompassing a product with
significant non-infringing components. The logical and readily
available alternative was the smallest salable infringing unit
with close relation to the claimed invention—namely the
processor itself.
Id. at 287–88 (emphasis added). After all, processor function itself is
only a part of a computer’s larger processor that also has significant
non-infringing components.

59.

For example, in Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d
703 (E.D. Tex. 2011), a patentee alleged that several features of Apple’s
OS X operating system appropriated its patented file organization
technology. The district court vacated the jury’s damage award in
excess of $200 million dollars. Id. at 727. The judge found the patentee’s
reasonable royalty analysis “fatally flawed” because it “did not present a
legally sound justification for its royalty base.” Id. at 726; see also cases
cited infra note 103.
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calculations. 60 But the Federal Circuit recently placed severe
restrictions on the use of previous licenses as evidence. 61 Specifically,
in ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., the court held improper the use
of bundling licenses without “factual findings that account[ ] for the
technological and economic differences” between the licenses and the
patent. 62 And under the entire market value rule, as espoused in
Lucent, patentees are unable to present any evidence of value outside
the patented component without proving that the component is the
basis for that outside value. 63
This paradox handcuffs patentees that fashion licenses based on
the entire value of an encompassing device, rather than just the
patented component. Under ResQNet, patentees are unable to present
those licenses without evidence showing the difference in value
between them and the patented device; yet patentees are
simultaneously precluded from presenting such evidence under the
entire market value rule. As one judge recently commented,
[i]f [the entire market value] rule were absolute, then it would
put [the] Plaintiff in a tough position because on one hand, the
patented feature does not provide the basis for the customer
demand, but on the other hand, the most reliable licenses are
based on the entire value of the licensed products. 64

Another important benefit of apportionment for courts is ease of
review. Even apportionment opponents recognize that “it may be
useful to create a thorough record for appellate review.” 65 As
discussed in the Introduction, the opacity of jury decisions creates a
serious stumbling block for the trial judge on post-verdict review and
60.

The first two of fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors consider “royalties
received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit” and
“rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to
the patent in suit.” Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.
(Georgia-Pacific III ), 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(explaining that “royalties received by the patentee from existing
licenses” should be considered, but courts should “exercise vigilance”
when analyzing this factor).

61.

ResQNet, 594 F.3d 860.

62.

Id. at 873. The court held that it was error to consider differing licenses.

63.

Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2009).

64.

Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW, 2011 WL
2417367, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 14, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 20121208 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2012).

65.

See, e.g., 110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 92 (responses of Kathryn L.
Biberstein, Senior Vice President, General Counsel, Alkermes, Inc., to
questions submitted by Senators Specter, Coburn, Kyl, and Grassley).
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the Federal Circuit on appellate review. An apportionment framework
would allow parties to introduce more evidence and would require
more detailed verdicts from the jury.
Jury confusion over damage calculations, moreover, has led to a
large disparity in award amounts across federal district courts. 66 This
disparity has seemingly led to forum shopping by patentees. 67
Consequently, “[e]normous damage awards continue to garner
headlines.” 68 Jury awards now vastly exceed the typical award given
in a bench trial. 69 These inconsistencies have induced patentees to
select protracted jury trials nearly four times as often as they did just
three decades ago. 70 For the first time, jury trials now eclipse bench
trials as the preferred method of patent litigation. 71
Regardless of what courts say the entire market value rule means,
there are two factors that would prove definitively that a patented
component truly creates the entire value of an infringing product:
either (1) the other components of the infringing product have no
independent value, or (2) there are no non-infringing alternatives for
the patented component. If any other component in the infringing
device has value, then it is impossible to say that the patented
component comprises the entire value. 72 To hold otherwise would
open the infringer to “royalty stacking”—a situation in which the
infringer pays damages or licensing fees multiple times for the same
component. 73 Similarly, if the patented component can be taken out of
the infringing device and replaced with an alternative, then the other
components must have independent value because they have
66.

The median damage awards from 1995 to 2011 ranged from $151,392 in
the Middle District of Florida to $36,025,989 in the Eastern District of
Virginia. Patent Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 23.

67.

For example, the Delaware District Court, having the second highest
median damage award, saw 168 patent cases from 1995 to 2011. In
contrast, the Middle District of Florida, ranked fifteenth in median
damage award, saw only 28. Id. at 24.

68.

Id. at 8.

69.

From 2006 to 2011, jury award amounts exceeded bench trial amounts
by a factor of 21.8. Id. at 10. This is not to say that jury awards are
incorrect, only that they differ largely from bench awards. See infra text
accompanying notes 131–32 (presenting empirical evidence showing that
jury awards are not exceedingly high in complex trials). Also, if jury
awards are high, it may be due to a lack of proper evidence upon which
to form a suitable damage award.

70.

Patent Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 9.

71.

Id.

72.

Love, supra note 52, at 274.

73.

Id. at 280. For an in-depth discussion of royalty stacking, see Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex.
L. Rev. 1991 (2007).
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functional utility without the patented component. 74 Yet the entire
market value rule goes far beyond these factors, perhaps because
courts have no alternative framework for determining a royalty base.
B.

The Wide Support for an Apportionment Finding

A simple three-step approach to reasonable royalty calculations,
including a distinct apportionment finding, has found support in
Federal Circuit case law, previously proposed congressional legislation,
and academia.
In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., the Federal Circuit
expressly stated that, with respect to damage calculations, “the
Court’s concern has been two-fold: [(1)] determining the correct (or at
least approximately correct) value of the patented invention, when it
is but one part or feature among many, and [(2)] ascertaining what
the parties would have agreed to in the context of a patent license
negotiation.” 75 This language essentially lays out an apportionment
calculation. The Court further recognized that “the base used in a
running royalty calculation can always be the value of the entire
commercial embodiment, as long as the magnitude of the rate is
within an acceptable range (as determined by the evidence).” 76 Thus,
under Lucent, it would appear appropriate to begin with the entire
market value, but lower the royalty rate with an apportionment
multiplier. 77
But, in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit
dismissed a patentee’s argument that, under Lucent, a plaintiff could
use an entire market value base if the royalty rate was low enough. 78
The court reasoned that, under current jurisprudence, a plaintiff could
use the entire market value only if he “prove[d] that the patentrelated feature is the basis for customer demand.” 79 As discussed later
in Part III.A, the apportionment proposed in this Note is not merely a
shifted royalty rate and is consistent with existing case law on the
entire market value rule.

74.

Love, supra note 52, at 276.

75.

Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2009).

76.

Id. at 1338–39.

77.

See id. at 1339 (“There is nothing inherently wrong with using the
market value of the entire product, especially when there is no
established market value for the infringing component or feature, so long
as the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the base represented by
the infringing component or feature.”).

78.

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2011).

79.

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336).
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Apportionment has also found congressional support. A two-step
damages process incorporating apportionment was proposed in the
2005, 2007, and 2009 House patent reform bills. 80 Each bill contained
similar language. But the 2005 House bill, in particular, contained
apportionment-like language. 81 Moreover, because the current patent
damages statute expressly allows expert testimony concerning
reasonable royalties, expert testimony on apportionment is within
legal limits. 82
A two step-process including apportionment has also garnered
wide support in academic circles. In a recent panel before the FTC,
professors of law and economics, lawyers, and businesspeople all
voiced support for an apportionment calculation. 83 When asked about
apportionment for reasonable royalties, distinguished Stanford law
professor Mark Lemley replied, “you’ve got to do apportionment. And
to some extent, of course courts always already do apportionment in a
reasonable-royalty case, they just don’t do it very well.” 84 He noted
that, although apportionment is considered in one of the GeorgiaPacific factors, “we never really pay a lot of attention to it.” 85 Lemley
described the current damages process as “fighting over broader
versus narrow royalty bases and what the right percentage of that
royalty base is without any context, without any specific evidence
about what the other contributors to the value of the product are.” 86
Similarly, legal scholars Eric Bensen and Danielle White wrote
that “apportionment should be the threshold question in every

80.

H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6(1)(B) (2005); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong.
§ 5(b)(2) (2007); H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(c)(1)(C) (2009). None of
these bills were passed into law. Damages reform was not included in
the recently passed America Invents Act. Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).

81.

H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6(1)(B) (2005) (“In determining a reasonable
royalty in the case of a combination, the court shall consider, if relevant
and among other factors, the portion of the realizable profit that should
be credited to the inventive contribution as distinguished from other
features of the combination, the manufacturing process, business risks,
or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.”).

82.

35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (“The court may receive expert testimony as an
aid to the determination of damages or of what royalty would be
reasonable under the circumstances.”).

83.

FTC Hearing, supra note 13.

84.

Id. at 215.

85.

Id. at 216; see also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301,
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The parties presented little evidence relating to
Factor 13.”).

86.

FTC Hearing, supra note 13, at 217 (emphasis added).
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reasonable royalty analysis.” 87 They argued that treating apportionment as a mere factor in the royalty calculation is insufficient because
a hypothetical negotiation would never result in the infringer giving
all of its profit to the patentee of just one component. 88 Finally,
Richard Gilbert, professor of economics at UC Berkeley, noted that
although there was no “magic formula” for apportionment, “in any
serious, complicated case it’s going to have to be an individual
investigation of the factors.” 89
Courts and scholars are not the only parties to support
apportionment and acknowledge problems with the entire market
value rule. Some industries, mainly complex technologies and
software, widely support apportionment. 90 Mary Doyle, Vice President
of Palm, Inc., noted that patent litigation against Palm has risen
sharply in recent years 91 and worried that the entire market value rule
is an excessive and poor method of damage valuation. 92 Likewise,
John Squires, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel for Goldman Sachs,
testified that “apportionment of damages is critical in the overall
patent infringement analysis.” 93 Squires worried that current damages
law encourages law firms to engage in “predatory litigation-abuse
behavior for purely economic gain.” 94 Finally, David Westergard,
87.

Bensen & White, supra note 15, at 1.

88.

Id. at 32–33.

89.

FTC Hearing, supra note 13, at 220–21.

90.

See, e.g., 110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 103 (statement of Mary E.
Doyle) (stating that Palm “faces both sides of th[e] issue, as a patent
holder and as an accused infringer,” and that apportionment “will
restore balance to the patent system by properly valuing inventors’
contributions”).

91.

Id. at 107 (“As of January, 2000, only one patent litigation case was
pending against the company. In the subsequent seven years, the
company has been sued 19 times more for patent infringement, 11 of
which cases were filed in the last three years.”); see also Patent
Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that the number of
patent actions filed in 2011 increased 22 percent over 2010).

92.

Mary Doyle described the trouble with the entire market value rule as
follows:
[E]veryone gets themselves all tangled up in their underwear, so
to speak, by saying: Well, I would never buy a car without a
windshield wiper or an intermittent windshield wiper, whatever
the variation on the theme is today. Well, okay, you wouldn’t,
but you wouldn’t buy a car without tires and an engine and
1700 other things either.
FTC Hearing, supra note 13, at 223–24.

93.

110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 171 (statement of John A. Squires).

94.

Id.
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Director of Patent Licensing at Micron Technology, argued that
apportionment “clears up the potential jury ambiguity” and that “we
need a more clearly articulated standard so that juries appreciate
what is necessary to be entitled to the entire market value rule.” 95
C.

Apportionment’s Criticisms and Alternatives

Apportionment has three main criticisms. First, NPEs 96 and
pharmaceutical companies 97 believe that apportionment will lower
average patent damages and thus devalue their patents. Second, some
scholars, most notably former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul
Michel, argue that apportionment would be impractical. 98 Finally, a
few scholars suggest that no change is needed because market
principles or post-verdict review can remedy improper damage
awards. 99 These criticisms are addressed in turn below.
1.

Apportionment’s Effect on Patent Values

Biotech opponents of apportionment present a doomsday scenario
where lower patent damages would disincentivize investment and kill
innovation. 100 In doing so, the industry points to studies predicting
significant losses in research and development funds. 101 But these
studies were produced by those industries opposing apportionment,
95.

Id. at 183 (statement of David Westergard).

96.

Id. at 34–35 (statement of Bruce G. Bernstein, Chief Intellectual
Property and Licensing Officer, InterDigital Commc’ns Corp.)
(“[A]pportionment would encourage free-riders and even existing
licensees to risk litigation rather than pay, or continue paying, a
market-negotiated licensing fee.”). It should be noted that the
manufacturing industry also opposed apportionment in the 2009 bill,
but did not explain why. Id. at 282 (letter from the National
Association of Manufacturers).

97.

See id. at 27–28 (statement of Kathryn L. Biberstein) (arguing that
apportionment will stifle investment in biotechnology).

98.

See, e.g., id. at 278 (statement of Paul Michel, C.J.) (arguing that
courts are “ill-equipped” to handle apportionment).

99.

See discussion infra Part II.C.3.

100. See, e.g., 110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 98 (statement of Kathryn L.
Biberstein) (“Innovative research into the development of innovative
environmental products, clean and renewable biofuels, and disease-,
pest- and drought-resistant crops will be diverted into less risky projects
because there is little if any deterrence to infringement.”); id. at 231
(letter on behalf of multiple industries, mainly biotech) (“The harm to
investment in tomorrow’s technologies would be felt immediately, and
would hurt U.S. competitiveness for years to come.”).
101. See, e.g., Scott Shane, The Likely Adverse Effects of an
Apportionment-Centric System of Patent Damages 4–5 (2009)
(paper prepared for the Manufacturing Alliance on Patent Policy),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/iphearings/540872-00014.pdf.
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and their methodologies have been called into question. 102 Even if the
studies were accurate, these critics still miss the point. The number of
cases resulting in excessive awards or misapplication of the entire
market value rule has risen sharply in recent years—especially in the
computer technology area. 103 Thus, lower damages awards may not be
an assault on patent strength, but rather an attempt to bring patent
damages back to a reasonable level.
102. Amy Landers presents a thorough debunking of the Shane report. Amy
L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and
Sequential Invention, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 471, 507–09 (2012).
103. In 2007, an apportionment opponent testified before Congress that other
than Lucent, “only one other case—an unpublished and thus nonprecedential opinion by the Federal Circuit—arguably misapplied the
entire market value rule.” 110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 34 (statement
of Bruce G. Bernstein). But a case need not invoke the entire market
value rule to struggle with apportionment issues. See, e.g., Eolas Techs.
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1939, 1942 (N.D. Ill.
2004) vacated in part, 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[Software]
bundling makes it very difficult for either party to assess the value of
each individual component.”).
Moreover, in the few years since the 2007 hearing, the number of
such cases has exploded. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
632 F.3d 1292, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming the grant of a new trial
on damages for an award of nearly $400 million for a software copy
protection technology); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860,
873 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (vacating a damage award of $500,000 for a remote
computer login technology); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.
(Lucent II ), 837 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1110 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (granting
motion for remittitur or new trial on remand after another excessive
award for the Day Patent); Mirror Worlds, L.L.C. v. Apple, Inc., 784 F.
Supp. 2d 703, 731 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (granting remittitur on a damage
award of nearly $210 million for a method of organizing documents on a
computer screen); Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp.
2d 279, 293 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting remittitur on a damage award in
excess of $180 million on a process for increasing the speed and efficiency
of a computer processor).
Costly debates over the entire market value rule’s applicability have
also multiplied. See, e.g., Inventio AG v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 06 Civ.
5377 (CM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88965, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 22,
2011) (granting the defendant’s motion in limine because the patentee’s
expert applied the wrong standard for the entire market value rule);
Mondis Tech. Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78482, at *17–20 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2011) (allowing
evidence on the entire market value and noting that a strict reading of
current entire market value rule jurisprudence would forbid the patentee
from presenting evidence of licenses based on a product’s entire market
value); Rolls-Royce PLC v. United Techs. Corp., 1:10cv457
(LMB/JFA), 2011 WL 1740143, at *7 (E.D. Va. May 4, 2011)
(excluding expert reports that failed to satisfy requirements of the entire
market value rule); IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp.
2d 687, 691 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (excluding expert testimony for “failing to
account for the economic realities of [the] claimed component as part of
a larger system”).
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Further, much of the criticism from biotech came in response to the
prior art subtraction language of the 2009 patent reform bill. 104
Although apportionment in the failed patent reform bill of 2005 105 was
closer to the idea proposed in this Note, the bills of 2007 106 and 2009 107
contained radically different language applying “prior art subtraction.” 108 The language of the 2007 and 2009 bills was largely responsible
for the strong opposition to apportionment at that time 109 and likely
the reason damage reform was ignored altogether in the America
104. For example, Kathryn Biberstein posed the example of the Post-It note
to show the inherent dangers of prior art subtraction as follows:
Post-It notes have two components: (1) scraps of paper; and (2)
a glue that enables a user to peel apart the glued together scraps
of paper from the pad without damaging the paper. Ordinarily,
one would pay no more than a few pennies for either the scraps
of paper or for the glue. Yet, a pad of Post-It notes costs over a
dollar. The reason is the combination of the glue and paper has
a value that is worth much more than the value of the
components alone.
110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 117.
105. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6(1)(B) (2005) (“In determining a reasonable
royalty in the case of a combination, the court shall consider, if relevant
and among other factors, the portion of the realizable profit that should
be credited to the inventive contribution as distinguished from other
features of the combination, the manufacturing process, business risks,
or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.”).
106. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5(b)(2) (as introduced in Senate, Sept. 10,
2007) (“[T]he court shall conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable
royalty . . . is applied only to that economic value properly attributable
to the patent’s specific contribution over the prior art. The court shall
exclude from the analysis the economic value properly attributable to
the prior art, and other features or improvements, whether or not
themselves patented, that contribute economic value to the infringing
product or process.”).
107. H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(c)(1)(C) (2009) (“[T]he court shall conduct
an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty is applied only to the
portion of the economic value of the infringing product or process
properly attributable to the claimed invention’s specific contribution
over the prior art. In the case of a combination invention whose
elements are present individually in the prior art, the contribution over
the prior art may include the value of the additional function resulting
from the combination, as well as the enhanced value, if any, of some or
all of the prior art elements as part of the combination, if the patentee
demonstrates that value.”).
108. 110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 27 (statement of Kathryn L. Biberstein).
109. See, e.g., id. at 57 (statement of Bruce G. Bernstein) (“This proposed
‘subtraction’ language appears to be nothing more than a thinly veiled
attempt to severely minimize (and potentially effectively eliminate) the
cost of infringement.”).
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Invents Act 110—the largest patent reform bill in at least half a
century. 111 Although prior art subtraction should be a part of an
apportionment calculation, it is not the only part. Further, recognizing
the unique value of small contributions in biotech, this Note’s proposed
framework specifically addresses the biotech industry and affords it
special consideration in apportionment calculations. 112
Like the biotechnology industry, NPEs face real economic harm
from apportionment. The NPE argument against apportionment is
simple: (1) NPEs do not make products, so the value of their
patents—and hence their business model—relies largely on the
damages they could get at trial; (2) apportionment will lower overall
damage awards; and (3) apportionment will therefore cause economic
loss for NPEs. 113 But while the economic harm is real, NPEs ignore
the fact that “[o]ver the last decade, median damage awards for NPEs
have significantly outpaced those of practicing entities.” 114 Further,
NPEs are increasingly disfavored by courts. 115 Apportionment will
simply bring NPE damages in line with the norm.
2.

Trial Courts’ Ability to Handle Apportionment

Judge Michel, while acting Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit,
sent multiple letters to Congress opposing apportionment. 116
Lawmakers and apportionment opponents seized on those letters
during debate. 117 Judge Michel argued that apportionment is too
110. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
111. See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the
America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 Fed. Cir. B.J. 435 (2012)
(providing a thorough analysis of the America Invents Act and its
sweeping changes to U.S. patent law); Joe Matal, A Guide to the
Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 Fed.
Cir. B.J. 539 (2012) (continuing the previous analysis).
112. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
113. See 110 Hearing, supra, note 18, at 27–28 (statement of Kathryn L.
Biberstein) (discussing the economic impact of implementing
apportionment damages on NPEs).
114. Patent Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 7.
115. Several recent Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions have come
down against NPEs. See John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls”
and Patent Remedies, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2111, 2012–13 (2007)
(discussing recent cases decided against NPEs).
116. 110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 277–81.
117. See, e.g., id. at 37 (statement of Bruce G. Bernstein) (“InterDigital
shares the concerns expressed by Chief Judge Michel that . . . a novel
and complex mandatory apportionment standard is unnecessary and
would greatly increase the cost, delays and uncertainty of patent
infringement litigation . . . .”); id. at 226 (statement of Kathryn L.
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difficult a task for courts—that courts are “ill-equipped” to apportion
because “generalist judges lack experience and expertise in making
such extensive, complex economic valuations, as do lay jurors.” 118
Judge Michel further predicted that apportionment would “require a
new, kind of macroeconomic analysis that would be extremely costly
and time consuming.” 119
But Judge Michel only echoes old fears raised not only in patent
law against reasonable royalty itself, but also in comparative
negligence and antitrust law. These fears have long been proven
unfounded.
Reasonable royalties are a jury’s best guess—a “hypothetical
negotiation.” 120 The Federal Circuit recently cautioned that royalty
calculations “necessarily involve[ ] an element of approximation and
uncertainty.” 121 Courts have recognized the inherent inaccuracy of
reasonable royalty calculations since their inception. 122 Indeed,
opponents of such damage calculations nearly a century ago made the
Biberstein) (“BIO urges Committee members to carefully consider
the . . . letter from Chief Judge Michel of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, which has been charged by the Congress with ensuring
consistency in the application of patent law throughout the country.”).
118. Id. at 278 (statement of Paul Michel, C.J.); see also id. at 279
(“[C]onfusion and inconsistency would reign, making predictions about
damage awards nearly impossible. Settlements would likely decline,
while the economic analysis required would greatly lengthen trials and
complicate appellate review.”).
119. Id. at 281. It should be noted, given Judge Michel’s strong fear of chaos in
the courtroom, that he has seemingly never sat on the bench for a patent
trial—or any trial—during his long and honorable judicial career. See
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, Fed. Jud. Ctr., http://
www.uscourts.gov/judgesandjudgeships/biographicaldirectoryofjudges.aspx
(search for “Michel”; then follow the “Michel, Paul Redmond” hyperlink)
(last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (showing that Judge Michel has never been
appointed to a trial bench); see also WestlawNext, http://next.
westlaw.com (search for “advanced: JU(Michel)”; follow “Cases” hyperlink
on the upper-left; on the left under “jurisdiction,” expand the “federal” list)
(last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (revealing zero instances of Paul Michel sitting as
judge for a bench trial by designation or otherwise).
120. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
121. Id. at 1325 (quoting Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512,
517 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
122. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 647
(1915) (“It well may be that mathematical exactness was not possible,
but . . . that degree of accuracy is not required but only reasonable approximation, which usually may be attained through the testimony of
experts and persons informed by observation and experience. Testimony
of this character is generally helpful and at times indispensable in the
solution of such problems.”).
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same arguments Judge Michel makes today. 123 Yet nearly a century
later, reasonable royalties are the most common form of patent
damage award. 124 And their inherent inaccuracy is not forgotten. For
decades, until just recently, parties arbitrarily began reasonable
royalty negotiations at 25 percent, regardless of the technology at
issue. 125 But the Federal Circuit eventually held that the “25 percent
rule of thumb is a fundamentally flawed tool . . . because it fails to tie
a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.” 126
Juries have also made complex damage valuations for over a
century in comparative tort negligence. 127 Critics of apportioned
negligence a century ago also made arguments like those Judge Michel
made to Congress. 128 Yet comparative negligence has long been
accepted in American courts. 129 Even today, some scholars continue to
argue that juries are the “primary flaw” in complex medical
123. See George P. Dike, The Trial of Patent Accountings in Open Court, 36
Harv. L. Rev. 33, 47 (1922) (addressing concerns over the “complication of issues to be tried and the evidence to be heard” by concluding
that “[t]he best way to handle complicated problems is for the judge to
hear the evidence, question witnesses, experts and counsel, and by
working with them reach the decision of the case”). Dike further noted
that “[e]ven intricate technical patent questions become amazingly
simple when subjected to careful analysis by trained judges who have
the power of eliminating non-essentials” and that “the time of the judge
might actually be conserved, since the time saved in deciding the case
would fully make up for that occupied by the trial.” Id. In fact, many
problems leading to the demise of apportioned profits in 1952 were
based on the inability to review the sparse evidentiary trail left by
special masters who conducted their own independent fact-finding. Erick
S. Lee, Historical Perspectives on Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages
and Current Congressional Efforts for Reform, 13 UCLA J.L. &
Tech., no. 2, Fall 2009, at 12.
124. Patent Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 11.
125. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1314–15 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (citing cases following the 25 percent rule).
126. Id. at 1315. The court characterized the application of the 25 percent
rule as “arbitrary, unreliable, and irrelevant.” Id. at 1318.
127. See Federal Employers’ Liability Act, ch. 149, § 3, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908)
(current version codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53 (2006)) (“[T]he fact that the
employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar
a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee.”).
128. See 42 Cong. Rec. 4435 (1908) (statement of Rep. Henry Clayton) (“It
is urged by some that such a provision is impracticable of
administration and that juries will not divide the damages in accordance
with the negligence committed by each.”).
129. See J. Shahar Dillbary, Apportioning Liability Behind a Veil of
Uncertainty, 62 Hastings L.J. 1729, 1733 (2011) (discussing the merits
of contributory negligence and apportioned liability).
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malpractice cases. 130 But those criticisms have been thoroughly
debunked. 131 As one pair of scholars put it, “[j]urors do not appear to
be as naive as some commentators have assumed.” 132
Last, jury damage apportionment has been a long-standing
practice in anti-trust law. 133 In fact, the apportionment of comingled
trusts was the basis for patent profit apportionment in the nineteenth
century. 134 Current cases involving antitrust apportionment exhibit
many of the same evidentiary concerns as patent damage
apportionment, and could be used to guide the development of patent
apportionment case law. 135
3.

Is Change Even Warranted?

Scholarly opponents of apportionment claim that no change is
necessary for two main reasons: (1) apportionment largely ignores
market principles; and (2) the court system is already equipped to

130. Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice and the American Jury 3
(1995).
131. Vidmar provides empirical evidence and case studies questioning many
of the strongest anti-jury arguments in medical malpractice cases—
arguments that apply equally to patent cases—including that juries
“favor[ ] plaintiffs,” that juries are “not competent to decide the complex
technical issues,” that juries are confused by “‘hired gun’ experts,” that
juries are “unreliable and capricious” in their liability and damage
decisions, and that the professionals can make better decisions on
damages. Id. at 7. While it would be impossible to prove that juries are
objectively beneficial to complex litigation, Vidmar concludes that
critics’ evidence does not support their claims of jury malfeasance. Id. at
22. Vidmar calls the critics’ charges a “major misdiagnosis.” Id. at 265.
Further, Vidmar finds that empirical evidence does not support the
hypothesis that objective legal professionals reach better results than a
lay jury. Id. at 234.
132. Id. at 158 (quoting Valerie P. Hans & Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich, Jurors
and Experts, 16 Advocate: The Magazine for Delaware Trial
Lawyers 17, 20 (1994)).
133. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic,
152 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that it was proper to measure
damages by apportioning the defendant’s profits through a comparison
of profits before and during anticompetitive activity).
134. See Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 214–15 (1881) (“The rule adopted
was that which the court in fact applies in cases of trustees who have
committed breaches of trust by an unlawful use of the trust property for
their own advantage; that is, to require them to refund the amount of
profit which they have actually realized.”).
135. See Blue Cross, 152 F.3d at 593 (Posner, C.J.) (calling the plaintiff’s
expert damage reports “worthless” because they failed to account for
factors other than anticompetitive behavior that may have led to profit
increases).
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handle excessive damage awards through post-verdict judgments,
remittitur, and appeal.
First, some argue that market principles should dominate royalty
base calculations. 136 For example Martin Simpson, General Counsel
for the University of California, suggests that apportionment should
be treated as its own hypothetical negotiation, similar to reasonable
royalty. 137 But market principles have already been exhausted at the
time of trial—patent disputes typically end up in trial only after
market principles have failed. In fact, an estimated 90–95 percent of
patent cases settle or never make it to trial. 138 The courts need step in
only once the parties have failed to arrive at a market-based solution.
And even then, market principles should still be considered, and are,
as a part of the framework proposed in this Note.
Second, others argue no change is needed because damage awards
are not trending that high, 139 and the few “rogue” cases with excessive
damages can be handled through post-verdict judgments, remittitur,
or appeal. 140 But post-verdict judgments and remittitur are often
appealed anyway. 141 And, as discussed in Part II.A, appeals and postverdict judgments are not useful when the trial record lacks sufficient
evidence for review. 142

III. Applying Apportionment in Modern Cases
Jury confusion could be minimized by application of a simple
three-step damages calculation that asks the jury to return: (1) the
base product at issue and its market value (“Royalty Base”), (2) the
percentage value of the patented component using three apportionment factors discussed below (“Apportionment Factor”), and (3) a
136. See Elizabeth M. Bailey, Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez,
Making Sense of “Apportionment” in Patent Damages, 12 Colum. Sci.
& Tech. L. Rev. 255, 271 (2011) (“An approach consistent with
economic principles would largely eliminate damages in excess of the
true economic value of a patent and align damages awards with
incentives to innovate.”).
137. FTC Hearing, supra note 13, at 232 (“[T]hat’s part of a negotiation, of
trying to find for the parties to come to a negotiation about what a
reasonable value is.”).
138. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 73, at 2030.
139. See Landers, supra note 102, at 507–09 (debunking studies that show no
increase in damage trends).
140. David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent
Law, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 127, 130–31 (2009).
141. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1308–09
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (involving an appeal after denial of a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
142. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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reasonable royalty rate based on the fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors
endorsed by the Federal Circuit, most recently in Uniloc 143 (“Royalty
Rate”). The jury’s decision would be based on expert testimony from
both sides 144 as guided by the relevant factors. To calculate damages,
the Royalty Base, Apportionment Factor, and Royalty Rate are
simply multiplied together. If a jury returned both a reasonable
Royalty Rate and Apportionment Factor based on the facts, it would
be easier for the Federal Circuit to analyze the verdict for error on
appeal.
This Part begins in Section A by laying out proposed
apportionment factors. Section B discusses how this new framework is
consistent with current entire market value rule jurisprudence.
Finally, Section C argues that juries, rather than judges, should
determine the apportionment value.
A.

Possible Apportionment Factors

Cases dealing with the royalty base and the entire market value
rule, past apportionment cases, and recent scholarly work all provide
guidance as to the type of factors a jury should consider when
determining the percentage apportionment value for patented
components. The factors should reflect three central concepts: (1) a
component’s intrinsic importance to the product at issue (“Intrinsic
Factor”), (2) the component’s extrinsic importance to the product’s
market value (“Extrinsic Factor”), and (3) the nature of change in
the industry (“Industry Factor”). These factors are discussed below
with examples of the type of evidence a party could submit for each.
1.

Intrinsic Factor: Overall Complexity of Infringing Product and
Relative Importance of Patented Component

The Federal Circuit rejected a patentee’s application of the entire
market value rule in Lucent, in part because “Lucent’s expert never
explained to the jury . . . whether the patented invention is only a
small component or feature of the licensed product (as is the case
here).” 145 This factor is fairly simple and direct. Courts should, using
Lucent as a guide, direct a jury to consider the complexity of the

143. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
144. Under Fed. R. Evid. 706(a), the court could also appoint its own
expert damages witnesses if necessary. See Monolithic Power Sys., Inc.
v. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd., 558 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding
that, in a complex patent case, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in appointing an expert witness under Fed. R. Evid. 706(a),
but noting that such appointments are rare).
145. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1330.
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infringing product and whether the patented part is “only a small
component or feature.” 146
Chief Judge Rader, sitting by designation in the Eastern District
of Texas, made a similar argument in IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red
Hat, Inc. 147 In that case, the patentee sought damages based on the
entire market value of the infringer’s operating system, which
contained a single patented feature—the ability to create multiple
virtual workspaces. The patentee’s expert used evidence from online
forums, showing that some users found the virtual workspaces
“essential” to the operating system, to claim the entire market value
as the base. 148 The infringer, on the other hand, moved to strike the
patentee’s expert testimony, arguing that the evidence was improper
under the entire market value rule. 149 Judge Rader agreed with the
infringer and granted the motion. 150 In doing so, he found that “[t]he
claimed invention is but one relatively small component of the
accused operating systems. The evidence shows that the workspace
switching feature represents only one of over a thousand components
included in the accused products.” 151 He further found that the
“relative importance of certain other features such as security,
interoperability, and virtualization” evidenced the patented feature’s
“small role in the overall product.” 152
The complexity of the overall product and the relative importance
of the patented feature should be considered by the jury when
considering the royalty base. The type of evidence that can be offered
by both parties in support of this factor is straightforward. For
instance, parties could show how many components are in the device,
what the function of each part is, and how important each component
is to the overall function of the product. Parties can also reuse
evidence presented in a prior Markman hearing to show where the
claims end and the unpatented components begin. 153
This factor most resembles language in the defeated patent reform
of 2009. 154 It is essentially a prior art subtraction—what is left when
146. Id.
147. IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Tex.
2010).
148. Id. at 690.
149. Id. at 688–90.
150. Id. at 691.
151. Id. at 689–90.
152. Id. at 690.
153. See Landers, supra note 102, at 477 (“[T]he court’s claim construction
identifies only the inventive aspects of the claim over the prior art.”).
154. See H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(c)(1)(C) (2009) (“[T]he court shall
conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty is applied only
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the unpatented components are conceptually separated from the
product. 155 But recognizing the inherent inadequacy of prior art
subtraction, 156 this internal valuation is only one piece of a larger
inquiry. The following external factor attempts to remedy that
inadequacy.
2.

Extrinsic Factor: Extent to Which the Patented Feature
Creates the Value of the Component Parts

The classic test for invoking the entire market value rule is
whether the patented feature is “the basis for customer demand.” 157
Often, the patented feature is simply a basis for demand, leaving a
jury to determine some lesser royalty base without any real guidance.
The Federal Circuit has long held that evidence of a patented
feature’s impact on the value of unpatented components is relevant
for a reasonable royalty calculation. 158 Juries should consider the
external pressures that drive a component’s market value. Several
cases involving the entire market value rule provide examples of the
types of facts a jury should consider in deciding how a patented
feature drives demand.
First, a patented feature can be said to drive demand when it
allows an infringing device to be used in a new market for the first
time. In Manufacturing Co. v. Cowing, for instance, the patented
technology allowed gas pumps to be used in a new way. 159 The
Supreme Court found that, without the patented component, the
infringer would not have been able to even enter the market. 160
Specifically, the Court held that if an improvement is required to
adapt a machine to a new use, and there is no other product
providing that use, then it is clear the infringer has secured the
to the portion of the economic value of the infringing product or process
properly attributable to the claimed invention’s specific contribution
over the prior art.”).
155. See Landers, supra note 102, at 477 (advocating the use of “conceptual
separation” because prior art “must be valued and subtracted from the
prior figure to derive the total”).
156. See id. at 478 (“Simply because claims are based on pre-existing
information does not mean that even the finest logic can credibly
unravel their separate inputs.”).
157. Lucent Techs., v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. See TWM Mfg. Co., v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(“Where a hypothetical licensee would have anticipated an increase in
sales of collateral unpatented items because of the patented device, the
patentee should be compensated accordingly.”).
159. Mfg. Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253 (1881).
160. Id. at 255.
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advantage of a new market and that the “fruits of this advantage are
the entire profits he has made in that market.” 161
The reasoning employed in Manufacturing Co. may be useful in
determining apportionment values in modern products. When a
patented component alone enables an infringing product to enter a
new and lucrative market, its economic value to the product as a
whole is greater. In such a case, a patentee could produce evidence
that, without the patented component or similar non-infringing
alternatives, the infringer’s product would be unsuccessful in
penetrating the market at issue. Conversely, the infringer could show
market penetration without the infringing component or similar noninfringing alternatives already in the market.
Second, a patentee can show that its component drives consumer
demand with evidence that consumers buy the infringing product
because of that patented component. Surveys detailing the impact of
a feature on consumer decisions will be relevant. 162 Indeed, in old
apportionment cases, courts relied on consumer surveys. In Roemer v.
Simon, 163 for example, the patentee failed to present sufficient demand
evidence. In that case, the circuit court denied damages to the creator
of a lock for traveling bags. 164 The court found that the patentee
presented no evidence disputing that “[t]he form, material, or
workmanship, of the bag itself may have been, and [was] quite likely
to have been, as decisive with the purchaser as, and perhaps more so
than, the lock.” 165 More recently, Judge Rader in IP Innovation
denied use of consumer surveys that were insufficiently tied to the
entire market value of the product at issue. 166 But even if the jury
decides such evidence should be given little weight, this evidence
would be useful in an apportionment calculation.
Parties could further prove or disprove an effect on market
demand by presenting marketing materials. These may include

161. Id.
162. See Patricia Dyck, Beyond Confusion—Survey Evidence of Consumer
Demand and the Entire Market Value Rule, 4 Hastings Sci. & Tech.
L.J. 209, 237 (2012) (“[C]onsumer demand survey evidence may prove
necessary and valuable . . . as a mechanism for apportionment . . . .”).
163. Roemer v. Simon, 31 F. 41 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887).
164 Id. at 42.
165. Id.
166. IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (E.D.
Tex. 2010) (“[S]elected users’ statements in isolation and without a
relationship to the actual claimed technology do not show an accurate
economic measurement of total market demand for the switching
feature, let alone its contribution to the demand for the entire product
asserted as the royalty base.”).
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product web sites, promotional content, and print advertisements, 167
but could also include product packaging, internal business plans and
market analyses, analyst and industry reports, and articles in trade
publications. 168 If an infringing product’s seller advertises the patented
component heavily, the patentee should be entitled to a royalty on a
larger percentage of the base value.
Third, the Uniloc court established that a patentee could use the
entire market value rule if the patented feature “substantially
create[s] the value of the component parts.” 169 But even if the added
value is not sufficiently substantial, a jury deciding a lesser royalty
base should still consider the extent to which the patented feature
adds value to the unpatented parts. One simple way to measure this
added value is by comparing the profits of the infringing product to
the profits of products that produce a similar result without
infringing. This idea is illustrated in Metallic Rubber Tire Co. v.
Hartford Rubber Works Co. 170 In that case, the patented component
was a tread for a tire. 171 The infringer sold tires both with and
without the infringing tread. The district court, under the old profitapportionment method, determined apportionment by calculating the
difference between the profits made from selling tires with the new,
better tread and those made from selling tires with the old tread. 172
Similarly, in P.P. Mast & Co. v. Superior Drill Co., the district court
compared profits of an infringing seed drill to a similar drill that
produced the same result without the infringing component. 173
Fourth, a defendant could conversely lower the patented
component’s assigned value by providing evidence of value in the
unpatented components. If the non-infringing components have
substantial value on their own, then the patented component’s value
in relation to the product as a whole must be less. The Federal
Circuit considered a similar approach in TWM Manufacturing Co. v.
Dura Corp., which concerned a patented truck suspension. 174 The
court affirmed a damage award that included unpatented wheels and
167. Kristopher A. Boushie, Apportionment of Intellectual Property Damages
and the Entire Market Value Rule, Fin. Valuation & Litig. Expert,
Feb.–Mar. 2008, at 17, 18.
168. Id.
169. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (alteration in original).
170. Metallic Rubber Tire Co. v. Hartford Rubber Works Co., 275 F. 315 (2d
Cir. 1921).
171. Id. at 317.
172. Id. at 318–19.
173. P.P. Mast & Co. v. Superior Drill Co., 154 F. 45, 53 (6th Cir. 1907).
174. TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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axles, noting that the lower court “could not have apportioned the
infringing sales if such apportioning had been appropriate” because
the defendant “did not show how many, if any, of the patented
devices were sold alone without wheels and axles.” 175
Another case involving the value of unpatented parts, Wales v.
Waterbury Manufacturing Co., involved a patented belt buckle
adapted for attaching a pencil holder. 176 The patentee attempted to
recover the profits made from the attached pencil holder sold with the
belt. The holder was not covered by the patent-in-suit. The Second
Circuit struggled to valuate the patented buckle because the holders
were never sold on their own and there was “no competent and
reliable evidence . . . to show what part of the profits the defendant
derived from the buckles and what part from the holders
separately.” 177 The court noted that the buckle was “certainly the
dominant feature” and that “but for the use of the buckle, the buckle
and holder would not have been a marketable device.” 178 Relying on
Garretson and its newly formed entire market value rule, the Second
Circuit overturned the district court’s award and ordered payment of
all profits attributable to the buckle-holder combination. 179
Fifth, non-infringing alternatives—or design arounds 180—are an
important tool for extrinsic valuation. An infringer can show that the
patented feature does not drive consumer demand by offering
evidence of consumer preferences for non-infringing alternatives. 181 If
consumers readily buy similar products without the patented
component, then it is unlikely that the patented component is a
considerable cause of demand for the infringing product. In other
patent damage contexts it is already accepted practice to lower or

175. Id. at 901.
176. Wales v. Waterbury Mfg. Co., 101 F. 126 (2d Cir. 1900).
177. Id. at 128.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 129–31.
180. Under the “design around” doctrine, “competitors are entitled to review
the public record, apply the established rules of claim construction,
ascertain the scope of the patentee’s claimed invention and, thus, design
around the claimed invention.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90
F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
181. See Love, supra note 52, at 290 (“A great deal of improper application
of the entire market value rule could be prevented if accused infringers
were permitted to offer evidence that the patented invention at issue
had reasonable alternatives as a means to defend against the doctrine’s
application.”).
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fully mitigate damages through evidence of non-infringing alternatives. 182 Courts undertake a similar analysis in antitrust cases. 183
Parties can also use evidence of an infringer’s projected profits to
establish value relative to design arounds. Projected profit evidence is
already often introduced as part of the “analytical method” of
calculating reasonable royalty. 184 In TWM the Federal Circuit
affirmed a reasonable rate calculated by subtracting the industry’s
standard net profit rate from the projected net profit rate of
infringing sales. 185 Similarly, parties in an apportionment proceeding
could produce evidence of projected net profits compared to net
profits for valuable design arounds in the industry.
Last, parties could provide evidence of prior judgments or licenses
covering other components of the same product. 186 But under current
entire market value rule jurisprudence, licenses covering unpatented
components would likely be excluded from trial. 187 Courts should
allow defendants to produce such evidence (1) to prove that the entire
market value rule should not apply and (2) to show value in noninfringing components that would aid a jury in its apportionment
calculation.
3.

Industry Factor: Nature or Pace of the Industry

Courts should consider the typical value of incremental change in
the industry at issue. Although this factor could be a part of the
Extrinsic Factor discussed above, its importance is too great to bury
within another analysis.

182. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Acceptable substitutes that the infringer proves
were available during the accounting period can preclude or limit lost
profits . . . .”).
183. Love, supra note 52, at 290 (citing United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956)).
184. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
185. TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
186. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 73, at 2041 (arguing that defendants
“should be entitled to introduce evidence about prior judgments or
licenses covering other attributes of the same product”).
187. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1316–17 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (citing multiple cases holding that a patentee cannot rely on
licensing agreements concerning products different from the patent-insuit); see also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (“The Supreme Court has long rejected the view that
damages are recoupable for the profit attributable to other patents
embodied in a competitive device of the patentee.”).
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The debate over apportionment has largely been one between
biotechnology on one side and electronics and software on the other. 188
The pharmaceutical industry is among the strongest opponents of
apportionment. 189 Simply put, drug makers believe that the slow
incremental nature of the industry would lead to harsh results under
an apportionment regime. 190 To remedy this issue, trial courts should
consider the nature of the industry in apportionment calculations.
Courts must recognize that in biotechnology small enhancements over
the prior art are the norm and provide large increases in commercial
value over previous products. 191 On the contrary, the push for
apportionment has come largely from the software and electronics
industries. 192
Though courts may be hesitant to treat different industries
differently, there is much legislative and regulatory support for giving
special consideration to intellectual property rights in the biotech
industry. For example, the recently enacted Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act included a provision granting limited non-patent
188. See Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court
Decisions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
2–3 (2009) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) (“There has been an
ongoing controversy, really summarized with the high-tech and
entertainment industry arguing that the entire market value
methodology is undesirable. There ought to be apportionment of
damages, and traditional manufacturing and pharmaceuticals are in the
other direction.”).
189. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
190. One advocate for the pharmaceutical industry and opponent of
apportionment posits the problem as follows:
Assume, for example, that a new buffer formulation results in an
“only” 10% improvement in the shelf life of a biotech drug
product. Even though the technological advance over the
preexisting formulation is relatively small, such an improved
product can take a large market share of the previously-existing
product because, for example, it allows distributors and
wholesalers more flexibility in shipping and warehousing and
reduces the amount of unused, expired product that is returned
each month. In this example, the royalty award for infringement
should be based on the significant economic benefit conferred by
the invention, not on the relatively small technological advance.
110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 66–67 (statement of Kathryn L.
Biberstein).
191. See Editorial, Patent Reform Acts Ugly, 25 Nature Biotechnology
1187, 1187 (2007) (noting that apportionment—as proposed in 2007—
fails to comprehend situations where “the inventive step might be a
minor, but vital, sequence change or a nuanced but essential difference
in a molecular structure”).
192. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text.
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exclusivity rights to biological products. 193 All told, there are at least
five other types of government-created non-patent exclusivity provisions for biotech products 194: (1) new chemical entity exclusivity (five
years), 195 (2) new clinical study exclusivity (three years), 196 (3) orphan
drug exclusivity (seven years), 197 (4) pediatric exclusivity (six
months), 198 and (5) generic drug exclusivity (180 days). 199 Given the
regulatory and statutory habit of treating biotech differently, there is
little reason courts should not do the same. Even Judge Richard
Posner recently called “[t]he pharmaceutical and software industries
. . . the extremes so far as the social benefits and costs of patent
protection are concerned.” 200 Courts could recognize biotech’s unique
nature by instructing a jury, under the Industry Factor, to greatly
increase a biotech component’s apportionment value.
Alternatively, rather than considering this a “factor,” courts could
instruct juries to start an apportionment value at 100 percent and
work down for biotech patents while starting at 0 and working up for
patents in other industries. Essentially, this would be a shift in
burden—for biotech patents the entire market value rule would be
presumed and the infringer would have to prove apportionment is
warranted, while for other patents the patentee would have to prove
the value of its patent. The previously listed exclusivity statutes and
regulations could serve as a simple guide to what constitutes a biotech
patent for apportionment purposes.
In sum, in industries like biotech where small incremental changes
generally create large economic windfalls, apportionment should be
higher. Juries should be instructed in a way that raises the
193. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§§ 7001–7002, 124 Stat. 804 (2010) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)
(Supp. IV 2010)).
194. Alice O. Martin & Sendil K. Devadas, Patents with an “I” = Patients,
18 Annals Health L. 261, 265 (2009).
195. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2006); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii)
(2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2) (2008)).
196. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(4)(iv) (2008)).
197. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 316.31(a) (2008)).
198. Id. at 266 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b) (2006)).
199. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006)).
200 Richard Posner, Do Patent and Copyright Law Restrict Competition
and Creativity Excessively?, Becker-Posner Blog (Sept. 30, 2012
10:30 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-andcopyright-law-restrict-competition-and-creativity-excessively-posner.html
(“The problem of excessive patent protection is at present best
illustrated by the software industry. This is a progressive, dynamic
industry rife with invention. But the conditions that make patent
protection essential in the pharmaceutical industry are absent.”).
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apportionment value accordingly. Contrarily, the software industry is
one of rapid growth, where small incremental changes matter less.
Juries should lower the apportionment value to reflect that reality.
B.

The Entire Market Value Rule Does Not Preclude Apportionment

In Uniloc, the Federal Circuit cautioned against merely shifting
the royalty rate to compensate for a lower royalty base. 201 The court
believed that mere mention of the entire market value would “skew
the damages horizon for the jury.” 202 But the apportionment proposed
here is not merely a shift in the royalty rate. Instead, it is a qualifier
denoting how much weight the jury gave to the entire market value.
Thus, this framework is not contrary to Uniloc.
Invoking the entire market value rule within apportionment
would require a 100 percent apportionment finding. In order for a jury
to find that 100 percent of the infringing product’s value comes from
the patented component, a plaintiff should still have to prove that the
component is the basis for consumer demand. It is irrelevant that the
entire market value is used in the calculation, because if the
apportionment finding is less than 100 percent, the actual base is not
the entire market value. In other words, “[t]here is no need to
highlight the [entire market value rule] to a jury because it is already
accounted for in the apportionment calculation.” 203 Rather, the entire
market value rule serves as a marker for the jury—a 100 percent
value occurs only when the component is the basis for market
demand. Otherwise, the jury must decide some lesser value based on
the evidentiary factors—a value that will be listed on the verdict form
and subject to review for substantial evidence.
Adding an apportionment qualifier to the entire market value rule
would likely remove the source of confusion that leads juries to
skewed damage calculations. Reducing the base by an apportionment
factor takes the actual dollar amount out of the jury’s damages
horizon. Further, it is much easier for a judge to see error when a jury
expressly states the percentage of the entire market value used.
Otherwise, as is the case now, judges are left to review some
seemingly arbitrary black-box value derived from the conflicting
testimony of damage experts.

201. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“The Supreme Court and this court’s precedents do not allow
consideration of the entire market value of accused products for minor
patent improvements simply by asserting a low enough royalty rate.”).
202. Id.
203. Merritt J. Hasbrouck, Comment, Protecting the Gates of Reasonable
Royalty: A Damages Framework for Patent Infringement Cases, 11
John Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 192, 213 (2011).

180

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012
Apportionment: Shining the Light of Day on Patent Damages
C.

Why a Jury and Not a Judge?

Some proponents of apportionment believe that the issue should
be considered as a matter of law—outside the scope of jury
deliberation. 204 Scholars argue that judges can mitigate disparities in
patent damage awards by assuming a “gate-keeping role” and limiting
the damage evidence that eventually goes before a jury. 205 Similarly,
the Federal Circuit, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
recognized that some issues in patent litigation, such as claim
construction, are better suited for a judge. 206 This is mainly due to
timing during the litigation process and a desire for uniformity in
subsequent litigation. 207
Some of the arguments against a separate apportionment
proceeding illustrate why damage calculations should not be
bifurcated between a judge and jury. For example, some scholars
argue that apportionment is inextricably tied to reasonable royalty,
and thus should not be separated at all. 208 As discussed earlier,
continued reliance on current precedent—where there is no separate
apportionment—has been ineffective. But apportionment opponents
illustrate the important point that evidence for both apportionment
and royalty rate overlap. Indeed, the fact that apportionment was
considered as a factor in Georgia-Pacific, even if it has been
underused, demonstrates its place as an important jury consideration.
This is not to say a judge has no role. Indeed, a trial judge still
has the most important role—as “gatekeeper”—to ensure that
evidence produced by the parties is fairly relevant to apportionment
and reasonable royalty calculations. 209
204. Landers, supra note 102, at 509–12.
205. Id. at 509.
206. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir.
1995) aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding that claim construction is “a
matter of law exclusively for the court”).
207. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390–91.
208. See, e.g., Megan L. Wiggins, Comment, Patent Reform and Damages
Apportionment: Addressing the Concerns of Industry-Scale Users of the
U.S. Patent System Without Legislatively Mandating a “Specific
Contribution over the Prior Art”, 40 Seton Hall L. Rev. 273, 310
(2010) (arguing that apportionment would hurt, rather than help,
patentees).
209. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“Under Daubert, the district court must exercise its ‘gatekeeper’
function in ensuring that scientific testimony is relevant and reliable.”
(citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)));
see also Hasbrouck, supra note 203, at 216 (“When judges more
aggressively utilize their gatekeeper powers . . . juries are presented with
more reliable and less confusing information to be used when
determining a reasonable royalty amount.”).
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IV. The Day Patent in a New Light
This Part posits how the damage trial in Lucent could have
proceeded if the court had applied this Note’s proposed framework.
The hypothetical trial would proceed in two basic steps. First, the
parties would present evidence addressing the relevant GeorgiaPacific factors and the relevant apportionment factors fashioned in
Part III. Then the judge would instruct the jury, for each infringing
product, to return three findings: (1) the Royalty Base, (2) the
Apportionment Factor, and (3) the Royalty Rate.
A.

Evidence at Trial

1.

Royalty Base

The jury must first determine the Royalty Base—the entire
market value of the product at issue. This determination seems
simple, but Lucent illustrates that it is no straightforward task. Do
we apply the apportionment calculation to the value of the Microsoft
Office suite? Or just Outlook? Or something smaller? The best
solution is to follow Judge Rader’s advice in Cornell and use the
“smallest salable infringing unit.” 210
In Lucent, there were two distinct products at issue: the Microsoft
Office suite and standalone Microsoft Outlook. A royalty base should
be separately calculated for each. While it may seem overly
complicated to calculate distinct damage values for each infringing
product, juries typically do just that. 211 Thus, the Royalty Base would
be the entire market value of either Microsoft Office or Outlook,
depending on the sale at issue. Evidence of these values would be
simple—sales records, for example. In this hypothetical case, such
records should be allowed even though they contain the product’s
total market value. The jury’s Apportionment Factor calculation will
prevent a skewed award, as discussed in the following Section.
2.

Apportionment Factor

Next, the parties would turn to the apportionment factors. The
parties’ damage experts would begin by estimating an Apportionment
Value. In the actual trial, Lucent impliedly argued for the entire
market value. 212 Under this Note’s proposed framework, the entire
market value rule is equivalent to a 100 percent Apportionment
210. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 288
(N.D.N.Y. 2009).
211. See, e.g., Verdict Form at 16, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No.
5:11-cv-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012), ECF No. 1930 (itemizing
damage awards for eighteen distinct alleged infringing products).
212. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
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Factor. Lucent would be precluded from arguing for a 100 percent
value without presenting evidence that the date picker is the basis for
customer demand for each Microsoft product. It seems unlikely that
such evidence exists. Lucent could start at a very high figure, say 90
percent. But the danger is that without sufficient evidence backing
that high figure, the jury may see Lucent’s expert as not credible.
Lucent would be wiser to start with a more realistic but still high
figure, perhaps 10 percent. Lucent’s expert would in essence be saying
that the date picker comprises 10 percent of the value of the
Microsoft product. Given the complexity of Microsoft Office and the
relative unimportance of the Day Patent, Microsoft’s expert would
start with a very small value, perhaps 1 percent or less. 213
The first Intrinsic Factor is highly relevant in Lucent because the
Day Patent is such a conceptually small piece of Office as a whole.
For Office sales, Microsoft would first offer evidence of the sale price
for each standalone program in Office to show Outlook’s relative
importance to the Office bundle. Lucent could counter with evidence
of advertisements for the bundle or surveys showing that consumers
buy the bundle mostly for Outlook. This evidence would be the
deciding factor in the differing Apportionment Factors between sales
of Office and standalone Outlook.
Next, Microsoft would proffer evidence of the myriad components
within Outlook, including their number, and perhaps the development
time and costs associated with each. In response, Lucent would want
to show that the Day Patent’s touchscreen-only date picker is
important to the overall function of Outlook. They would likely be
unable to do so.
After this, under the Extrinsic Factor, the parties would produce
evidence of the Day Patent’s effect, or lack thereof, on market
demand. Lucent would want to produce consumer surveys, Microsoft
marketing materials, or other evidence showing the importance of the
Day Patent to Outlook’s sales. Microsoft could bring similar evidence
showing that it hardly advertised its touch-screen date picker feature.
Lucent could argue for a greater value by showing that there are no
alternative designs to the Day Patent, while Microsoft could
conversely show non-infringing alternatives to support a lower value.
Finally, the parties would consider the Industry Factor. The
software industry is perhaps the most complex and fast-paced
industry in existence. Thus, a lower apportionment value would be
warranted. 214
213. It may be appropriate for a court to set a minimum value. If reasonable
royalty is meant to be a floor to damage amounts, it should not be zero
or negligible. There is not yet any de minimis defense to patent
infringement.
214. Alternatively, as discussed in Part III.A.3, supra, the Industry Factor
could instead be a shift in burden to the infringer rather than a factor
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After considering these factors in the context of evidence and
testimony, a jury would select a percentage representing the
Apportionment Factor of the patented components of each infringing
product. The court could phrase the question as “what percent of the
total value of Microsoft’s product comes from the Day Patent?”
Given the values offered by the parties’ experts, the jury would
choose a value between 10 percent and the less-than 1 percent value
proffered by Microsoft. The sheer weight of evidence for all factors in
this case favors Microsoft—and a very low apportionment value. The
touch-screen date picker is just one of many thousands of Outlook
features, and not an important one. Lucent would probably be unable
to produce much evidence that the patented feature swayed consumer
purchase decisions, or even that the feature was in high use. The jury
would likely side with Microsoft and choose a value close to 1 percent.
3.

Reasonable Royalty Rate

The parties would next present any additional evidence relevant
to the Georgia-Pacific factors. Some of the evidence will overlap with
the apportionment factors discussed above. Attorneys and experts
need only point out how each piece of evidence is relevant to each
factor. The Georgia-Pacific factors and related evidence actually used
are reviewed thoroughly in the Lucent appeal and need not be
repeated here. 215 The Federal Circuit noted that the parties failed to
produce substantial evidence on Factor 13—the apportionment
factor. 216 That does not matter, as, in this framework, Factor 13 is
rendered moot by a distinct apportionment calculation. For the
purposes of this hypothetical, we will assume that the jury, given the
same evidence, reached the same reasonable royalty rate of 8
percent. 217
B.

The Jury Verdict

With the three components determined, the damage calculation is
simple: multiply the Base Value of the infringing product by both the
Apportionment Factor and the Royalty Rate. The Base Value in
Lucent ($8 billion), 218 when multiplied by a small Apportionment
Factor (1 percent in this hypothetical) and the same Royalty Rate (8
for the jury to consider. In this hypothetical, the burden would remain
on the patentee to prove how much value its patent comprises in the
parent product. In biotech the burden would shift to the infringer to
show that its product contains value aside from the infringing
component.
215. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325–36.
216. Id. at 1332.
217. Id. at 1323.
218. Id.
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percent), 219 would result in a lump-sum reasonable royalty of
approximately $6.4 million. 220 That award is nearly identical to the
amount that the infringer, Microsoft, had proposed—a result the
Federal Circuit seemed to call “economically justified.” 221
A simple jury verdict form would contain three blank spaces for
each determined value: Base Value, Apportionment Factor, and
Royalty Rate. The spaces would be followed by an instruction to
multiply all three numbers together to calculate the final lump sum
award.

Conclusion
The benefit of apportionment, as outlined in this Note, is clear
when applied to Lucent. In that case, the patented date-picker feature
was merely one of dozens of components in the software, and not a
significant feature when compared to the software’s main e-mail functionality. Had the jury been instructed, based on testimony and
evidence, to derive a percentage value for the date-picker compared to
the software as a whole and the component’s market effects, the
amount would have likely been small. Also, an apportionment
proceeding would vastly increase the types of evidence that parties
could introduce at trial. This would reduce costly and protracted
evidentiary disputes and leave a clear record for review.
Josh Friedman †

219. Id.
220. $8,000,000,000 × 0.01 × 0.08 = $6,400,000.
221. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339 (“Microsoft surely would have little reason
to complain about the supposed application of the entire market value
rule had the jury applied a royalty rate of 0.1% (instead of 8%) to the
market price of the infringing programs. Such a rate would have likely
yielded a damages award of less than Microsoft’s proposed $6.5 million.
Thus, even when the patented invention is a small component of a much
larger commercial product, awarding a reasonable royalty based on
either sale price or number of units sold can be economically justified.”).
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